GNSS signals reach the ground at extremely low power, which makes them inherently vulnerable. For FPV and small UAV platforms, the dangerous failure is rarely "no satellites at all" — it is a plausible but wrong position being fed to the flight controller.
Three common interference types
- Jamming: noise injected into the navigation band raises the receiver noise floor until the demodulation threshold is lost. Symptoms include position jumps, a sudden drop in satellite count, or a complete loss of lock.
- Spoofing: counterfeit signals that mimic the real structure induce an incorrect position or time solution. This is harder to notice, because the position may drift smoothly.
- Unintentional interference and multipath: onboard electronics, ground reflections, building occlusion and nearby transmitters. Often misdiagnosed as "poor signal" when it is really an installation or EMC problem.
Protection has to be layered
Layer one is the antenna. Polarisation, gain pattern, mounting position and shielding by carbon fibre or metal determine what actually reaches the receiver. No downstream module can recover a signal blocked at the mounting point. Grounding and power return paths also matter: high-current onboard loads can couple noise straight into the RF front end.
Layer two is the RF front end. Strong out-of-band signals can drive the LNA into compression; pre-selection filtering and limiting decide whether the receiver survives. The value here is staying operational, not restoring a fix.
Layer three is the receiver and fusion algorithm. Multi-constellation, multi-frequency tracking, observation consistency checks and INS/barometer coupling determine how long usable navigation persists when part of the constellation is unavailable. The critical output is a confidence estimate: when fusion quality degrades, the system must tell the layers above.
Layer four is flight-controller policy. Post-loss behaviour must be defined in advance — attitude or altitude-hold mode, hover and wait, heading-based return, or alert and await operator input. Without this layer, the first three only delay the failure by a few seconds.
The honest boundary of an anti-jamming module
State the premise clearly in any procurement discussion: such a module raises the degradation threshold and makes degradation observable. It does not provide immunity to full-band suppression. Any claim of "guaranteed no loss of lock" lacks an engineering basis.
Technical agreements should therefore specify test conditions rather than conclusions: interference type, band and bandwidth, equivalent jamming power or J/S ratio, distance and relative bearing of the source, and the threshold for "still usable" (for example, a position error ceiling and reacquisition time). Two datasheets produced under different conditions cannot be compared.
Pre-flight and acceptance checks
- Record a quiet-site baseline: visible satellites, fix mode, estimated horizontal accuracy and cold-start time.
- Check self-interference: toggle video transmitter, ESCs and high-power loads individually and watch the navigation state.
- Review installation: antenna orientation, clearance from metal and carbon fibre, feed routing and grounding points.
- Rehearse the fallback: simulate loss of lock in a safe environment and confirm the controller executes the intended behaviour rather than an uncontrolled action.
- Require the supplier to document measurement conditions, not just supply a parameter table.
Conclusion
GNSS resilience is a system problem spanning antenna layout, EMC, receiver algorithms and controller fallback. Specifying acceptance conditions concretely reduces integration risk far more than comparing marketing language.